Abstract-Real-world entities are not always represented by the same set of features in different data sets. Therefore matching and linking records corresponding to the same real-world entity distributed across these data sets is a challenging task. If the data sets contain private information, the problem becomes even harder due to privacy concerns. Existing solutions of this problem mostly follow two approaches: sanitization techniques and cryptographic techniques. The former achieves privacy by perturbing sensitive data at the expense of degrading matching accuracy. The later, on the other hand, attains both privacy and high accuracy under heavy communication and computation costs. In this paper, we propose a method that combines these two approaches and enables users to trade off between privacy, accuracy and cost. Experiments conducted on real data sets show that our method has significantly lower costs than cryptographic techniques and yields much more accurate matching results compared to sanitization techniques, even when the data sets are perturbed extensively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integration of information maintained by different entities is critical for various applications. Consider the health care industry, where complete medical history of a patient is often not readily available to researchers at a single source but is distributed across many hospital databases. While medical researchers would try to experiment with as much data as possible, hospitals would not be willing to disclose private records of their patients. In this scenario, private record linkage is the first and possibly the most important step towards utilization of private information.
The process of identifying and linking different representations of the same real-world entity across multiple data sources is known as the record linkage problem. Since it is a key component of data integration methodologies, record linkage has been investigated extensively [1] . However especially after the introduction of powerful data mining techniques, privacy concerns related to sharing of individual information have pushed research towards the re-formulation of the record linkage problem and the development of new solutions [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . In order to prevent privacy concerns from hampering sharing of private information, two main approaches have been developed. These are sanitization methods that perturb private information to obscure individual identity [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] and cryptographic methods that rely on Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols [11] .
Sanitization techniques such as k-anonymization [8] or random noise addition [9] , [12] usually involve privacy metrics that measure the amount of privacy protection. Higher levels of protection typically translate into further deviation from the original data and consequently less accurate results. Therefore sanitization techniques involve trade-off between accuracy and privacy.
Cryptographic techniques do not sacrifice accuracy to achieve privacy. The algorithms applied to private data are converted to series of functions with private inputs. Then, using SMC protocols, accurate results are obtained. Under reasonable assumptions regarding computational power of the adversary, SMC protocols guarantee that only the final result and any information that can be inferred from the final result is revealed [11] . SMC protocols generally have some security parameters (e.g. encryption key sizes) that allow users to trade off between cost and privacy [11] .
Both those approaches are thus not able to provide a comprehensive solution addressing all relevant application requirements with respect to privacy, cost, and accuracy. The goal of our work is to address the limitations of such approaches. We propose a novel method to address the private record linkage problem that combines cryptographic techniques and anonymization methods, a branch of sanitization techniques. Unlike existing methods, trade-off in our solution is along three dimensions: privacy, cost, and accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first systematic approach in this direction.
We assume three participants in our method. These are two data holders, with the data sets to be linked, and the querying party, who provides the classifier that determines matching record pairs. The basic idea is to utilize anonymized data sets to accurately match or mismatch a large portion of record pairs so that the need for costly SMC protocols is minimized. We call this the blocking step, in reference to a similar technique employed in record linkage methods [13] . The blocking step provides cost savings proportional to the level of anonymity, set independently by each participant. Later on, the blocking step is followed by the SMC step, where unlabeled record pairs are labeled using cryptographic techniques.
If the input data sets are too large, we may have to label significant amounts of record pairs using cryptographic techniques. In such cases, since cost of the private record linkage process is not known in advance, data holder parties might be unwilling to participate. That's why, we consider limiting the costs of cryptographic techniques. This also allows us to analyze the cost-accuracy and cost-privacy relationships. When the upper bound imposed on SMC costs is too low, some record pairs might remain unlabeled at the end of the blocking step. In order not to reveal irrelevant pairs, we label them non-matched. While this precaution ensures 100% precision, it degrades recall since some of those unlabeled record pairs might actually be matching. Fortunately, anonymized data sets can help reduce the effects. Based on generalizations of records, pairs that are more likely to match can be given priority in the SMC step.
Our method has many advantages over existing methods. The main advantages can be summarized as follows:
. Without loss of generality, let the input data sets, R and S, be represented as relations. Let us also assume that these relations have the same schema, R(A, ...An) and S(A, ...An).
If not, schemas of R and S can be matched using private schema matching techniques (e.g. the method described by Scannapieco et al. in [5] ).
Given distance functions di : Dom(R.Ai) x Dom(S.Ai) -Et+, defined over domains of corresponding attributes of R and S, and matching thresholds 0i > 0, record linkage can be expressed as a join operation over R and S. A record pair (r, s), where r C R and s C S, is a matching record pair if di(r.ai, s.ai) < 0i for all attributes 0 < i < n. Then the join condition can be defined based on the following decision rule that returns true for matching record pairs and false for mismatching record pairs: dr (r, s) { true if VO < < n,di(r.ai, s.ai) < Oi false otherwise
Our task is to identify the join result R ><dr(r,s) S in a privacy preserving manner such that the result will be available to the querying party and private records of the data holders, that do not satisfy the join condition are not disclosed.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE SOLUTION
In this section, we provide an overview of the proposed solution. Our purpose is to exemplify the concepts before providing the formal definitions in Section IV and Section V.
Consider the relations R and S, with matching schemas (A1, A2), in Table I and Table II Figure 1 , the range of A2 is [1, 99 We conclude that a clear decision can not be made.
Repeating the process for all generalization sequences, 12 record pairs can be mismatched and 6 record pairs can be matched through the anonymized relations. Labels of the 18 remaining record pairs are unknown/undecided. For a formal discussion, please refer to Section IV.
In our method, all record pairs that cannot be labeled based on their generalization sequences are input to the SMC protocols. Given R' and S', there are 18 such pairs. Now, suppose that due to high costs, the participants can endure comparing at most 10 of these pairs with SMC protocols. We consider the problem of selecting these 10 pairs in Section V-C and labeling remaining 8 pairs in Section V-B. Details of the SMC protocols are provided in Section V-A.
Some extreme scenarios, regarding privacy requirements of the participants and cost limitations give excellent insights on the nature of privacy, accuracy and cost trade-offs in our method. Let us next discuss two of them.
(1) k = 1: privacy is minimum since anonymized relation is actually the original relation (R' = R in the example above). Yet, since anonymized relation is very precise (i.e. no generalization values), all record pairs can be labeled based on the anonymized relation. This implies no costs due to SMC protocols.
(2) k = lRl: privacy is maximum since anonymized relations (most probably) consist of records generalized to the root value of VGHs on all attributes. Therefore the costs would be similar to pure SMC methods.
IV. BLOCKING STEP Quasi-identifier attribute values of anonymized records are imprecise due to generalization but are always accurate in the sense that generalization values are chosen in accordance with the original value. Given generalization gen(r) of a record r, the value of the jth field of gen(r), denoted by gen(r).aj, determines the set of values that r.a, can assume. We call this set a specialization set and denote it with specSet(.).
If the jth field is not a quasi-identifier, then gen(r).a, = {r.ai} and therefore specSet(gen(r).ai) = r.a,. For discretevalued quasi-identifiers, specSet(.) consists of all leaf nodes of the value generalization hierarchy (VGH) of attribute i, into which gen(r).a, might specialize. For continuous attributes, specSet(.) represents an interval. Consider s' = gen(s5) in Table I , where specSet(gen(S5).aj) = specSet(s'.aj) specSet(SentiorSec.) = {llth, 12th} according to Figure 1. Anonymized data sets can help matching some record pairs and reducing SMC costs, as we have shown in Section III.
However, we cannot use dr(r, s) for this purpose, because instead of r and s, only gen(r) and gen(s) are available.
Therefore distance functions di do not apply anymore. In addition, now there are not two but three labels: match (M), mismatch (N), and unlabeled/unknown (U), since we cannot always decide whether given anonymized record pair matches or mismatches.
Before formalizing the blocking process, we would like to highlight the similarity with the probabilistic record matching problem discussed in [14] . In this version of the problem, the matching algorithm is not forced to label every record pair as match (M) or non-match (N). Instead, a third label, possible-match (P) is allowed. Whenever the decision between M and N is not obvious, the algorithm classifies it as P and delegates the decision to domain experts, who are accurate but expensive to hire. In our case, the SMC circuit corresponds to these domain experts since it attains high accuracy at high cost. The new decision mechanism corresponds to the probabilistic decision rule that identifies the sets M, N and P. The most important difference is that anonymized data is not dirty but imprecise, which is the reason why precision is 100% in our method.
Given two generalized values v = gen(r).ai and w gen(s).ai, we know for sure that (r.ai, s.ai) C specSet(v) x specSet(w). The greatest lower bound on the distance between any pair of elements within specSet(v) x specSet(w) is defined as the infimum of the distance values. If the infimum distance for anonymized records gen(rr).ai and gen(s).ai is larger than Oi, then we can determine (accurately) that di(r.ai, s.ai) > Oi. Slack 
According to the decision rule dr, a pair of records (r, s) should agree on all attributes to match. Our method initially tries to make the decision through the anonymized data sets by computing sds and sdl for each attribute. The slack decision rule, sdr(v, w)) can be expressed as
In classical SMC protocols, using some cryptographic assumptions, it can be proved that only the final results and anything that could be inferred by looking at the final results are revealed. In our case, we implicitly assume that the disclosure of the anonymized data is not a privacy violation. Therefore, our security guarantees are slightly different than the security guarantees provided by the generic SMC protocols [11] . In other words, our goal is to only reveal the final record linkage result, the anonymized data sets and anything that can be inferred by looking at the final result and the anonymized data sets. Since blocking step only depends on the anonymized data sets, it satisfies the goal stated above. (i.e. anything revealed during the blocking step could be inferred using the anonymized data sets.)
In this section, we describe methods for relabeling the record pairs that were labeled unknown (U) in the blocking step without revealing anything that could not be inferred by looking at the final result and the anonymized data sets. Also we assume that due to budget constraints of the participants, we can match at most SMC allowance many record pairs using SMC protocol invocations. If lUl < SMC allowance, then obviously all unlabeled record pairs can be relabeled using the SMC protocols. Otherwise, there are two problems to be addressed: (1) How are the pairs, not selected for the SMC step, relabeled? (2) How are the pairs that will be relabeled by the SMC protocols selected? Before delving into details of these issues, we discuss the possible SMC protocols.
A. SMC Protocols for Record Linkage
For each pair of records that is not blocked, we need to securely learn whether such a pair actually matches or not. In other words, for each possibly matching record pair and for each attribute, we need to securely calculate whether di(r.ai, s.ai) < 0i is satisfied or not. Such a secure calculation is possible using generic SMC circuit evaluation techniques [11] . Also recently many protocols have been proposed using special encryption functions such as commutative encryption [15] and homomorphic encryption [16] and send the result back to querying site. Using the private key, querying site can decrypt the received message to learn the distance result. Such secure distance evaluation could be combined with secure comparison to not to reveal even the distance result.
Although homomorphic encryption based SMC protocols could be used in our case, we would like to stress that in our SMC step, any SMC technique that can securely compute d(r, s) could be used.
B. Labeling Remaining Unlabeled Pairs
All record pairs labeled U in the blocking step might not be relabeled in the SMC step due to cost constraints. We next analyze 3 strategies for handling such record pairs. Notice that the method of selecting pairs for the SMC step, discussed in Section V-C, depends on the strategy chosen here.
(1) Maximizing precision: Based on anonymized data sets, a classifier cl that selects probably-matching record pairs is built. Selected record pairs are labeled by the SMC protocols. All record pairs that were not chosen by the classifier in the SMC step are labeled mismatch. Since SMC protocols are accurate, there won't be any false-positives. However, recall might be low since some remaining unlabeled pairs can match.
(2) Maximizing recall: Based on anonymized data sets, a classifier c2 that selects probably-mismatching record pairs is built. After the SMC step, all remaining unlabeled record pairs are considered matching pairs. Since SMC protocols are accurate, all matching pairs will be labeled correctly. Therefore recall is high, but precision might be low.
(3) Maximizing precision and recall: Record pairs for the SMC step are selected at random. Generalizations of selected pairs, together with the labels collected from the SMC protocol are used as training data to build a classifier C3 that labels generalized record pairs. Notice that if the set of matching attributes (0i < 1) is equal to the set of quasi-identifiers, then C3 can not discriminate record pairs that have the same generalization. Considering the k-anonymization method [8] , there are at least k records generalized to the same sequence.
This implies that groups of record pairs, with at least k2 cardinality, will be classified similarly. Due to low data quality resulting from anonymization, we conclude intuitively that C3 can not attain high precision or recall.
The first strategy would be advantageous to the data holder parties because high precision prevents disclosure of irrelevant record pairs to the party issuing the join operation. On the other hand, the second strategy would be advantageous to the query issuer, because recall is high. Yet, possibly low precision in the second strategy would violate privacy of individuals. Since privacy is our primary concern, we choose to follow the first strategy.
C. Selection Heuristics for Circuit Evaluation
Since we label all remaining unlabeled pairs as match, selection heuristics should aim at finding possibly matching record pairs. For this purpose, we define a third distance function dExp(gen(r).ai,gen(s).ai)) that returns the expected distance between generalized record values, gen(r).ai and gen(s) .ai.
Let V specSet(gen(r).ai) and W specSet(gen(s).ai) be the random variables that
represent possible values of r.ai and s.ai. Then dExp(gen(r).ai), gen(s).ai)) = E(di(V W)). To simplify this equation, we need to specify the distance function di and the probability distributions of V and W.
Without loss of generality, we assume that di is Euclidean distance for continuous attributes and Hamming distance for discrete (categorical) attributes.
Notice that participants would not (and should not) release any statistics on the distribution of original values within generalizations. Therefore, due to absence of such feedback, the best option is assuming R.Ai is uniformly distributed for each attribute i. In this case, any value v C V is equally likely.
For discrete attributes, this implies Pr(r.ai = v) = V/lVl. 
For continuous attributes, instead of computing the expected Euclidean distance (v(x y)2), we prefer to compute (xy)2. This allows further simplifications. Let ED denote the expected square distance. Our first step is inserting the value of this distance function as shown in Equation 6 . Then, based on the assumption that V and W are independent variables, Equation 7 is derived. Finally, in Equation 8, we simplify each term by integrating over the intervals of the uniform random variables: a, < v < b, and a2 < w < b2. ED = E( V2-2. V. W + W21) (6) = E(V2)-2 E(V) E(W) +E(W2) (7) = 1/3 (a2+ b2+ a 2 + b2+ albi + a2b2) (8) -1/2. (a, + bi) (a2 + b2)
Using expected distance functions, it is possible to devise many heuristics. We discuss some examples of such heuristics in Section VI.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We performed our experiments on the real-world Adult data set from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [17] . This data set has been heavily used to evaluate different anonymization methods and its quasi-identifier attributes and corresponding value generalization hierarchies have been well established. We adopted value generalization hierarchies of all attributes, except the continuous age attribute, from [7] (see Section VI-A for details). The hierarchy that we used consists of 4 levels and equi-width leaf nodes cover 8-unit intervals.
In order to build two input data sets, we first removed all tuples with missing values. The remaining 30,162 records were randomly partitioned into three data sets, dl, d2 and d3, each consisting of 10,054 records. Then, we merged d1 and d3 to build the first data set, D1, and d2 and d3 to build the second data set, D2. In this setting, regardless of the matching thresholds, Qi, corresponding records in the non-
should match each other.
We implemented the SMC circuit described in Section V-A using Paillier homomorphic public key cryptosystem with 1024-bit key length [18] . Experiments conducted with a PC that attains 2.8GHz clock speed and has 2GB available memory indicate that, on average, computing the distance for a single continuous attribute takes 0.43 seconds. Including file I/O, the anonymization method described in Section VI-A takes 2.02 and 2.03 seconds to anonymize D1 and D2 respectively. Blocking step costs 1.35 seconds on average. Notice that, in total, the costs incurred for non-cryptographic operations are equivalent to the cost of comparing only ( Our primary evaluation measure was accuracy. Please remember that in our method, any record pair that does not satisfy the join condition cannot be in the result set (i.e. no false-positives). Therefore, precision is always 100% and accuracy is actually determined by recall. In our context, recall is defined as the percentage of record pairs correctly labeled as match among all pairs satisfying the decision rule.
Recall measurements depend on the criteria for selecting the record pairs to be classified by SMC. We experimented 3 heuristics based on expected distance functions discussing in Section V-C. Record pairs with (1) minFirst: minimum attribute-wise expected distance first; (2) maxLast: maximum attribute-wise expected distance last; (3) minAvgFirst: minimum average attribute-wise expected distance first. Measurements corresponding to each heuristic are depicted as separate series in the figures.
We were also interested in the blocking efficiency of the underlying anonymization method, measured in terms of the percentage of record pairs that are permanently classified by the slack decision rule. For example, in Section III, among 36 record pairs, 18 pairs were blocked. Therefore the blocking efficiency would be 50%. Notice that blocking efficiency also indicates the sufficient SMC allowance to achieve 100% recall. For instance, if 99% of all record pairs were classified in the blocking step, we would have to match the remaining 1% using the SMC protocol in order not to leave out any matching pair.
Both evaluation measures, that are, blocking efficiency and recall, vary with the matching thresholds, Oi, as well as with the anonymization parameters, that are, anonymity requirement (k), set of quasi-identifiers. Recall also depends on the SMC allowance. Unless stated otherwise, default values of these parameters are as follows: k = 32, Oi = 0.05 for all quasiidentifier attributes, SMC allowance is 1.5% of all record pairs and the set of quasi-identifier attributes is {age, workclass, education, marital status, occupation}.
A. Anonymization Methods Anonymization methods play a very crucial role in our method. Existing anonymization methods perform very poorly in terms of blocking efficiency. Apparently, the reason is the employed anonymization metrics. Later in this section, we will present an anonymization metric that favors the attribute with maximum entropy. The idea behind this metric is increasing the number of different generalization sequences within the anonymized data set. Let us now briefly discuss two of the existing anonymization methods.
DataFly algorithm presented in [8] is one of the earliest anonymization methods. In this algorithm, records are generalized according to the attribute that has the most number of distinct values. When the anonymity requirement is met, or can be met by suppressing at most k records, the algorithm terminates. The attribute selection criteria is somehow similar to our entropy metric. But our method is not bottom-up, therefore we do not suppress any records.
In the top-down specialization method of [7] , the purpose is maximizing the accuracy of some classifier trained on the anonymized data set. The algorithm first generalizes all records to the lowest granularity. Then, at each step, for each partition of specialized records, among the attributes that respect the kanonymity requirement and that are beneficial for classification (i.e. information gain should not be 0), the one that maximizes information gain is selected. All records in the partition are specialized according to the selected attribute. This method has three major disadvantages for blocking purposes: (1) If a specialization is not beneficial, it is not performed. in Figure 3 .
For small values of k, due to high blocking efficiency, the SMC step can process all record pairs that are left unlabeled by the blocking step. However, as blocking efficiency decreases for larger values of k, the constant SMC-allowance level becomes insufficient. Due to the large number of unlabeled record pairs and limited SMC-allowance, recall decreases significantly (see Figure 4) . MinAvgFirst performs much better than the other heuristics on over-perturbed data sets. [7] . As described above, the TDS algorithm [7] ------- 
Min heir of Qni si -ideiitifier s The set of quasi-identifiers for the Adult data set is {age, work class, education, marital status, occupation, race, sex, native country}. For the experiment withuasi-identifiers, we used top-q of the attributes in this set. Figure 6 reports the blocking efficiency measurements for varying number of quasi-identifiers. Shrinking the quasiidentifier set increases the number of different generalization sequences within anonymfized data sets. This implies that smaller groups of records generalized to the same sequence, since the data set sizes are fixed. As the size of the generalization groups decreases, the ratio of record pairs blocked in the blocking step decreases. Figure 7 reports the recall versus the number of quasiidentifiers. As expected, recall increases as more record pairs are labeled in the blocking step. MinFirst heuristic has the poorest performance. MaxLast proposes the reverse procedure of [7] , starting from the most
general case and specializing down the VGHs. record matching workflows have been recently proposed [13] , [20] . However, few methods for private record matching have been investigated. Some initial approaches are motivated by the strict privacy requirements of e-health applications [3] , [4] . The work which is closely related to ours is by Al Lawati et al. [6] , that proposes a secure blocking scheme to reduce costs. The approach has the disadvantage to work only for a specific comparison function. Also, as the focus is mainly on efficiency, the effectiveness of the approach has not been assessed. Conversely, our approach can be used with different comparison functions.
In addition to the above approaches, there are two major areas that are closely related to our work, even though no work in such areas addresses our exact problem: secure set intersection and private data sharing.
Several approaches have investigated the secure set intersection problem (see [16] for a survey). Secure set intersection methods deal with exact matching and are too expensive to be applied to large databases due their reliance on cryptography. Furthermore, these protocols deal with the intersection of sets of simple elements, and are not designed for exploiting the semantics behind database records.
Agrawal et al. [15] formalizes a general notion of private information sharing across databases that relies on commutative encryption techniques. This work has opened the way to many other related protocols [21] , [22] .
Cryptographic methods usually require extensive communication and computation between participants. An alternative that has recently become popular is anonymization.
Anonymization techniques rely on the fact that privacy of sensitive data is a concern only if the individuals related to this data can be identified. However, removing personal identifiers does not always protect individuals against disclosure of identity. The most popular solution to anonymity problem is k-anonymity, which requires that an individual should be indistinguishable from at least (k -1) others in the anonymized data set [8] . VIII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we proposed a novel approach that combines anonymization and cryptographic methods to solve the private record linkage problem. Our method allows participants to trade-off between accuracy, privacy and costs. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study in this direction.
As future work, we will extend our existing solution to handle alphanumeric attributes (e.g., address information) as well. We will solve this problem by addressing the following two challenges: distance functions are much more complex than Hamming distance (e.g. edit distance) and there are many possible generalization mechanisms to choose from.
Another promising area of future research might be extending the idea of hybrid approaches to other privacy preserving data mining tasks. We believe that the hybrid approach could provide substantial performance improvements for privacy preserving distributed data mining protocols.
